3. Physician incentives have historically rewarded individual results, not collaboration. Today, fee-for-service (FFS) based physician compensation plans are typically anchored to individual physician activity. However, consolidated provider groups and those participating in VBC programs require significant collaboration to reduce cost of care and improve outcomes (in some studies, primary care coordination reduced costs by ~$300 per member per month for high-risk patients).
As different specialties and service lines have unique roles and impacts on overall performance and demand and a range of market-competitive compensation levels, setting both compensation structure and levels during this transition is complex. In addition, the emphasis on teamwork makes physicians understandably hesitant to accept compensation mechanisms that prioritize individual responsibility, or reward, for positive patient outcomes and value. In short, physicians worry that since they don’t have control over outcomes individually, that dictates, to some extent, their faith (or lack thereof) that the larger group is able to influence outcomes.
4. Because healthcare transformation is gradual, there is a serious risk of competing incentives. The transition to coordinated, value-based healthcare has been very gradual — despite proclamations to the contrary. In many cases, physicians now face opposing incentives to both increase volume (e.g., number of patient visits) and maximize non-revenue-generative value-driving activities (e.g., time spent tracking patient adherence to care plan). In a recent study, 70% of physician organization leaders noted that increasing the volume of services delivered is the top action that primary care and specialist physicians could take to increase their compensation — a statistic seemingly contradictory to industry tailwinds focused on value.
5. VBC introduces significant time lags between physician actions and ultimate organizational financial outcomes. Under value-based contracting models, financial payments are tied to patient outcomes rather than physician activities, and there is a considerable (multimonth) lag between physician activity and value-based payment. Given that historical physician compensation models pay for volume/physician actions, healthcare provider organizations need to develop incentive structures that balance near-term rewards for activities that are expected to yield value with longer-term incentive payments that tie to VBC results and financial payments the organization receives.
6. Very few organizations have “closed the loop” on measurement and reporting of VBC performance, and physician trust of outcomes data is low. To compensate physicians based on VBC performance, organizations must develop their data and analytics capabilities, identify and focus on the most impactful metrics, and invest significantly in building physician trust in the data. Most healthcare provider organizations have not yet closed the loop on VBC measurement and reporting. This challenge will only increase as healthcare organizations consolidate and become more complex.