

# Designing the optimal go-to-market strategy for MedTechs in Latam


## Historical movements and key considerations

April, 2024

These materials are intended to supplement a discussion with L.E.K. Consulting. These perspectives will, therefore, only be meaningful to those in attendance. The contents of the materials are confidential and subject to obligations of non-disclosure. Your attention is drawn to the full disclaimer contained in this document.




# The health sector has felt the increase in MLR in the aftermath of the pandemic, impacting the flow of capital throughout the system and MedTech companies




# Post Covid, MLRs reached an all time high and have not yet recovered, impacting payors' profit across the board

**Medical loss ratio (MLR), private payors (2015-23<sup>1</sup>)**  
% of premium revenue



**Payor's net income<sup>2</sup> by type<sup>3</sup> (2018-2023<sup>1</sup>)**  
BRL Billions




Notes: 1) Considers 2023 until 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter (last available data) 2) Operational and financial results 3) Includes only medical and hospital insurance  
Source: ANS; DataSUS; companies' websites; L.E.K. analysis and research

# Profitability has declined between 2019-23, from 2.7% to (3.0%), with 36% more payors operating in the negative spectrum - a trend experienced by all archetypes


**Total revenue of payors by operational result range (2019-23<sup>1</sup>)**

BRL Billions, % of revenue



**Operational result by payor type evolution (2019-23<sup>1</sup>)**

% of revenue




Notes: 1) Considers 2023 until 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter (last available data)  
 Source: ANS; L.E.K. analysis and research



# Beneficiaries and companies have been struggling to afford the high premium increases and are downgrading to basic plans and lower-cost verticalized players

**Private insurance profile by category<sup>1</sup>**  
(2016-22), % of beneficiaries

**Δ p.p.**  
(2016-22)



**5.0%**


**1.0%**

**(6%)**

**Beneficiaries by type of payor**  
(2016-2023), Millions of beneficiaries

**Δ p.p.**  
(2016-23)

**Avg. ticket<sup>2</sup>**



**3.2%**

**(0.2%)**

**(2.8%)**

**0.0%**

**(0.2%)**


Notes: 1) Basic – plans without free choice of provider by the beneficiary, Medium – plans with partial free choice of provider, Advanced – plans with total free choice of provider 2) Average range of the ticket paid by beneficiaries aged between 34 and 59 years old

Source: ANS; L.E.K. analysis and research

# Medtechs have not been able to pass on inflation in Brazil; In dollars, the price in 2023 is ~36% lower than in 2017 - generating pressure from the headquarters to recover profitability



Evolution of the I-OPME index vs inflation  
(Brazil, 2017-23)  
Base 100



- Medtech companies have **not been able to pass on prices in line with inflation in Brazil**, and this is even more the case for multinationals, which **seek a return in dollars**
  - As a result, there is **pressure from the headquarters to transfer and increase prices**
- OPME indices faced several pressures during the period, including:
  - **Consolidation movement** among major accounts, increasing their bargaining power to negotiate lower prices
  - **Intensified competition** with the entry of low-end players, coupled with high-end players reacting by lowering prices
  - Trend of some multinational companies expanding the relevance of the **direct sales channel** to mitigate compliance risks, resulting in cost reduction and market share gains


Capture of distributor margin is a way to boost margin recovery, as pressure from the healthcare system limits potential price increases

# To increase competitiveness and revenues, companies are attempting a series of initiatives, with special highlight to direct-sales

DIRECTIONAL

## Medtech illustrative pricing build-up

Sell-in prices = 100




## Market dynamics

- **Medtechs are increasingly focus on direct sales to strategic customers**
  - Primary goal is to capture distributor margins
  - But this engagement also supports cross-selling and enhances relationships with key providers
- **The approach is most effective for large providers and/or those in regions with simpler logistics**
  - In areas with complex logistics, Medtechs are seeking partnerships with logistic operators
- **On the other hand, payers and providers explore vertical integration to increase efficiency and gain a strategic edge in the chain**
  - Examples include Rede D'Or + Mederi, and Bradesco Saúde establishing its own hospitals

Source: L.E.K. analysis and research

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## In addition to revenue and profitability potential, compliance concerns, demand from clients, and service level alignment are also factors bringing direct sales to the top of C-level strategic agenda



- 1 • **Compliance:** cases of corruption ("CPI das próteses") and dubious incentives, raising the risk and latent concern in the case of multinationals
  - 2 • **Providers and payors looking for direct purchase:** objective of purchasing at a lower cost, with gains in scale and centralized purchasing
- **Level of service:** Direct sales can have a better effect when selling sophisticated and complex products, with a more technical presence in the field - although the distributor usually has more time available to the providers
  - **Access to and knowledge of the customer:** Indirect selling creates challenges in terms of market intelligence, lack of pricing data, customer context and feedback from the front end
  - **Strategic alignment and cross-selling:** A challenge in encouraging the distributor to pursue the same objectives as the company, such as promoting product categories that are strategic for the company.



# Compliance concerns are a constant in MNCs' agenda as many distributors have been involved in corruption by overpricing products and paying commission to physicians

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## “CPI das próteses”

Irregularities and crimes in medical procedures involving orthoses and prostheses, uncovering allegations of bribery, overpricing, and unnecessary surgeries for financial gain, implicating manufacturers, distributors, and physicians

### Scheme *modus operandi*

- **Physicians were billing up to 30% of the cost of OPME**, with the potential to override the technical decision-making process of the operation
  - **Instances of unnecessary procedures to boost revenues** – a study conducted by Hospital Albert Einstein indicates that in ~55% of cases, spinal surgeries were unnecessary
  - **Unnecessary replacements and intentional damage to parts to boost the volume of procedures** and the revenue generated
  - **Inflated pricing involving the sale of prostheses at rates up to 20x their market value**, facilitated through forged signatures and falsified documents
- **Processes were conducted through consulting contracts between the physicians and the distributors**, resulting in an additional income of up to R\$ 100,000 / month to the physicians
  - **Research from the regional medical council indicated that**
    - 37% of the respondents received some commission (>R\$500) in the last year
    - In medical colleges, 74% received or heard from colleagues who received benefits throughout the course
- **In the public system, distributors would advise those drafting tenders**, providing specific details to favor particular brands – thus securing a reward for the tender's author.

### Examples of brands that are involved in schemes



“... We were able to negotiate a 20% cash commission for endorsing our brand...”

- Seller, Oscar Iskin

“... We offer even more; we pay 30% if doctors recommend our brands...”

- Partner, Total Medic




**Laws approving penalties for corruption schemes in healthcare have been enacted to target frauds committed by manufacturers, distributors, and physicians, to enhance compliance in the sale of medical products**

# Moreover, large groups and hospitals are also demanding direct negotiations, to leverage bargain power from market consolidation

2

Number of non-SUS hospital beds by hospital type<sup>1</sup>  
(Brazil, 2016-23)  
Thousand of beds



- Rising costs and operational challenges **force providers and payors to buy directly from the manufacturer**, reducing one end of the value chain
- Large players are **consolidating the market**, thus bringing more weight to direct sales and purchasing on a larger scale

### Examples:

**REDE D'OR**

- Rede D'or acquires distributor (Mederi) consolidating its hospitals' purchases and going directly with the industry




- Hapvida, with a well-known procurement area, with difficult negotiations and very focused on price, seeking to incorporate a similar strategy for GNDI

Source: L.E.K. research, and analysis

## Direct-sales attempts, however, are not new in the market, but companies have struggled to find the right balance of channels, as tend to disregard operational complexity and distributors' reaction

### Go-to-market historic pendulum Back and forth attempts for direct sales



#### A) Direct sales motivations and rationale

- ✓ Potential to increase revenue by absorbing distributors' markup
- ✓ Interest to better control accounts' relationship and compliance
- ✓ Topline focus, with limited consideration on operational complexity and cost-to-serve, both direct and indirect (e.g., back-office), given lack of visibility of accounts' P&L

#### B) Operational difficulties and impacts

- ! Profitability difficulties, given higher cost-to-serve than initially forecasted, need to absorb smaller (less-profitable) accounts, and extended cash flows
- ! Market share loss due to:
  - Inability to sustain service level required by hospitals
  - Difficulties to increase the number of headcounts required on sales and back-office structures
  - Time to establish relationship with hospitals and physicians
  - Distributors' reaction / retaliation to direct sales movements, many times leveraging relationships to position competitors in the same lines


#### C) Return to legacy structure

- ✓ Return to indirect channel structure, but with need to give higher margins to partners and to rebuild distribution network, and difficulties to manage attritions with and concerns of partners

**Difficulties to create sustainable go-to-market structures deriving from failure to recognize all nuances of direct sales approach**

# Such difficulties are further exacerbated by external factors impacting the market

## Trends impacting the GTM strategy (2015-24)



Source: L.E.K. research, and analysis

## Therefore, direct-sales approach need to be planned at account-level, supported by robust business cases, and comprehensive considerations of operational complexities and risks

### ***Need for robust and comprehensive business case for the direct sales approach by account / segment...***

- **Topline potential**

- Account size for the lines of interest (vs. hospital size)
- Insurers profile of each hospital and reimbursement rates
- Market share potential by account

- **Commercial and fulfillment costs**

- Commercial structure, including sales and technical / surgery support teams
- Logistics and warehousing structure, including reverse logistics requirements
- Inventory, obsolescence and scrap costs

- **Backoffice costs and expenses**

- Backoffice enhancement costs (treasury, legal, tax, ...)
- G&A growth to control operation and dilution potential

- **Cash flow detractors**

- Payment terms and cash cycle
- “Glosa” rates by hospital segment and product line

- **Investments**

- Team hiring and training
- Logistics infrastructure (e.g., distribution centers)
- Equipment leasing for specific lines that rely on “comodato”
- Inventory purchase from distributor

### ***...that considers operational complexities and requirements, and distributors’ movements***

- **Service level required**

- Inventory, supply chain, and logistics
- Surgery support resources
- Services provided to hospitals

- **Back-office complexity and requirements**

- Accounting and finance, especially for OPMEs given “Fiscal Notes” dynamics
- Logistics and supply chain
- Market access

- **Timing and investments required to build relationship and re-list products in hospitals and insurers**

- Potential market share loss during transition period, given limited relationship

- **Distributors’ potential retaliation movements, impacts and mitigation factors**

- Transition to current and new competitors, accelerating market share loss movements
- Potential loss in perpetuity

- **Need to absorb smaller accounts, with smaller margins and similar operational complexity**

## Direct-sales approach need to be planned at account-level, supported by robust business cases, and comprehensive considerations of operational complexities and risks


### ***Need for robust and comprehensive business case for the direct sales approach by account / segment...***

- ***Topline potential within each account***
- ***Commercial and fulfillment costs (e.g., sales team, logistics, inventory)***
- ***Backoffice costs and expenses (i.e., G&A)***
- ***Cash flow detractors (i.e., Cash Cycle, “Glosa”)***
- ***Investments on people, logistics and equipment leasing***

### ***...that considers operational complexities and requirements, and distributors’ movements***


- ***Service level required (e.g., Inventory, logistics, surgery support resources)***
- ***Back-office complexity and requirements (e.g., Market Access, Supply chain)***
- ***Timing and investments required to build relationship and re-list products in hospitals and insurers***
- ***Distributors’ potential retaliation movements, impacts and mitigation factors***
- ***Need to absorb smaller accounts***

Moreover, companies should consider the optimal operational / partner structure and ways to build the required capabilities



Source: L.E.K. research, and analysis

**L.E.K. has supported dozen of companies in redefining their commercial strategies in Brazil and Latam, through a robust and tested methodology**



Source: L.E.K. research, and analysis





# We have extensive experience in the healthcare sector in Latin America, with strategy projects, looking at growth, M&As, portfolio, GTM strategy and pricing

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## Selected L.E.K. Brazil experience in the healthcare sector<sup>1-2</sup> (MEDTECH FOCUS)



Notes: 1) Includes (a few) companies evaluated in the strategic due diligence process for private equity funds; 2) L.E.K. Brazil also has experience in other markets such as Peru, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Uruguay

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**Founded  
1983**



**21  
Offices**



**~200  
Partners**



**~2,200  
Staff**



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